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Making international climate policy is difficult. The
issues are complex, the impacts of policies are large
and unevenly distributed, and the costs of erring in
any direction are high. International climate negotiators must address, among many tough topics, the
costs and benefits of reducing greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions; the distribution of these costs and
benefits across countries; the incentives for countries to participate in reducing global emissions; and
the innovation and diffusion of low-emissions technology, especially for use in developing countries.
How do we get from here to there? Whatever
overall goal we set for climate policy, our success in
achieving that goal effectively and efficiently will depend on the policy instrument we choose. No single
instrument is universally best for all environmental
problems; all policy instruments have strengths and
weaknesses, and the choice among them is a pragmatic and contextual matter. For global climate policy, five major options for policy instruments have
been suggested:
• technology standards, such energy efficiency
standards for vehicles and appliances or fuel
types for electric power generators;
• taxes on GHG emissions;
• subsidies and other rewards for GHG emissions
abatement;

• quantitative limits on each nation’s GHG emissions; and
• quantitative national limits, with a market in tradable GHG emissions allowances.
A growing number of countries (including the
United States, through both the Bush and Clinton
administrations) and experts have championed the
last of these options—the creation of an international market in tradable GHG allowances. The U.S.
government enacted this approach in 1990 to curb
domestic sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions that yield
acid rain and suggested the concept in the same year
as a potential remedy for global GHG emissions. But
at that time, the White House opposed quantitative
“targets and timetables” on GHG emissions. Without such aggregate quantitative constraints or
“caps,” a formal system of tradable allowances (a
cap-and-trade policy) could not function. The 1992
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) adopted at the Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil, imposed no quantitative target on aggregate emissions and asked countries only to undertake “policies and measures” to reduce emissions—with the proviso that such abatement actions
may be “implemented jointly” by countries. This
idea of joint implementation represented a window
for “informal” emissions trading through project-by-
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project collaborations but not a formal market in
tradable allowances.
Negotiations soon began on a protocol to implement the UNFCCC. The European Union had long
advocated fixed national quantitative emissions limits and expressed doubts about international emissions trading. In 1993, President Bill Clinton announced that the United States would also endorse
quantitative targets and timetables on GHG emissions; and the Clinton–Gore climate change action
plan advocated international allowance trading as a
way to meet that goal. In 1997, more than 2,000
economists—including several Nobel laureates—
signed a statement endorsing formal allowance trading to control global GHG emissions. After intense
negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC
was signed in December 1997 (however, as of 2000,
it had not yet been ratified by many countries, including the United States). The Kyoto Protocol included differentiated quantitative targets on GHG
emissions of industrialized countries, with aggregate
emissions by these countries to be cut to about 5%
below 1990 levels by 2008–12. No quantitative
emissions limit was applied to developing countries.
And the Kyoto Protocol authorized three different
versions of emissions trading to help accomplish this
goal: joint implementation of abatement projects
among industrialized countries (Article 6); a system
for developing countries to sell emissions reduction
credits to buyers in industrialized countries, called
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Article
12); and a formal system of tradable allowances
among industrialized countries (Article 17).
If the Kyoto Protocol enters into force, the stage
will be set for international markets in GHG abatement. Both economic theory and actual experience
suggest that creating such GHG emissions markets
offers great promise for lowering the cost of GHG
control, enhancing the spread of lower-emissions
technology, and broadening participation in the international agreement to limit GHG emissions.
Designing such a market is not simple. Concerns
have frequently been expressed that international
emissions trading could be difficult to initiate, monitor, and manage. There are concerns about negotiating allowance allocations, ensuring participation, de206 CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS AND POLICY

terring free riding, reducing cross-national “leakage,”
measuring emissions, and enforcing compliance.
These concerns are important, but they pertain to
any GHG emissions control policy, using any policy
instrument. They are generic concerns about global
climate policy. Indeed, a market-based approach
could actually ease these challenges. A second set of
concerns, less frequently discussed, relates uniquely
to a market-based instrument: concerns about transaction costs, the behavior of national governments,
and market power. These specific concerns will need
to be confronted in the design details of a GHG trading system.

The Case for International
Emissions Trading
An international climate agreement could, in theory,
use any of the five policy instruments outlined
above. The advantages of emissions trading can be
seen most clearly by comparing national caps with
and without emissions trading; the actual treaty negotiations have focused on these two options. Without trading, a treaty would simply require every participating country, acting on its own, to limit its
emissions to a certain level (its target or cap) by a
certain date. Different countries could have different
caps that imply different degrees of stringency; for
example, the caps on industrialized countries could
require absolute reductions in projected emissions,
whereas developing countries in the future could be
afforded substantial “headroom”—flexibility to increase their emissions as they develop economically.
By contrast, under a market-based emissions trading
approach, countries would achieve the same aggregate cap but with the flexibility to trade (that is, reallocate by mutual agreement) their emissions abatement efforts across countries. Again, different
countries could initially receive allowances equivalent to national caps of different degrees of stringency.
Two basic kinds of international markets for GHG
emissions abatement can be envisioned. One is a formal emissions trading market—a system of tradable
allowances often called cap and trade. In this market,
the international agreement sets a cap on aggregate
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emissions for some period, and the agreement also
allocates GHG emissions allowances (often also
called emissions permits) among the participating
countries for that period. The national governments
then allocate these allowances to businesses within
their countries. Emitters must hold allowances to
cover every unit they emit; they can control emissions, buy additional allowances if their abatement
costs are high, and sell allowances if their abatement
costs are low. (In practice, carbon dioxide emissions
could be regulated upstream by associating allowances with the carbon content of fossil fuels.) Organized exchanges are established to facilitate trading. To ensure compliance with the allowance cap, at
the end of each period, each country’s report of its
actual emissions (subject to monitoring and verification) is compared with the allowances held for that
period by its emitters; if national emissions exceed
total allowances held, then the country is out of
compliance with the treaty and subject to whatever
penalties for noncompliance the international agreement stipulates. (The penalties under the Kyoto Protocol were left for future negotiation.)
The allowances in this system could be fully interchangeable, or fungible—each one representing a
unit of GHG emission, without reference to the
country from which the allowance originated—so
that buyers could rely on the value of the allowance
without investigating the seller’s behavior. In that
case, seller compliance would be ensured in the
same ways as under a national cap without trading.
Or, allowances could be denominated by the seller
country, with the provision that a selling country’s
violation of its national abatement commitments
would devalue the seller’s allowances, thereby giving
buyers an incentive to purchase from the sellers
most likely to comply with the treaty (and sellers an
incentive to ensure compliance if they hope to sell
additional allowances).
In an informal emissions trading market, on the
other hand, the international agreement does not allocate formal allowances. Instead, each country may
meet its abatement commitment through contracts
for project-by-project abatement services (GHG reductions or sequestration) obtained both within and
outside its territory. Thus, emitters seeking to invest

in abatement services may do so at home, and they
may also purchase credits for emissions reductions
generated in other countries, including countries not
subject to an overall emissions cap. These are the
project-based trading systems envisioned by Article
6 (joint implementation among industrialized countries with emissions caps) and Article 12 (CDM
credits from developing countries without emissions
caps) of the Kyoto Protocol. The value of such credits will depend on the actual abatement undertaken
at the specific site; the investor or a certifying entity
must closely monitor the ongoing performance of
the project. Abatement is measured against a baseline forecast of emissions from that project in the absence of the joint implementation or CDM investment. Investor countries’ compliance with emissions
caps is determined by comparing the country’s cap
with the country’s actual national emissions, minus
the abatement achieved at the specific overseas project sites credited to the country’s investors. This approach is similar to the system of pollution offsets
and emissions reductions credits adopted by the
United States prior to the acid rain program to control other air pollutants. It is also essentially the system of joint implementation launched in the UNFCCC signed in 1992 at the Earth Summit. That
pilot phase of joint implementation, however, did
not allow official quantified credits to be earned by
joint implementation activities, and investment in
joint implementation was predictably muted. Under
Articles 6 and 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, official credits could be earned by joint implementation and
CDM investments, presumably encouraging a more
vigorous market in such project-based trading than
had been the case under the UNFCCC pilot phase.
In both of these approaches to emissions trading,
all transactions would be voluntary. The motivation
for trading is the desire to find more advantageous
ways to comply with GHG limits. The operative
principle is mutual benefit: Sellers and buyers will
enter into transactions only when the terms of the
deal, including financial and nonfinancial rewards,
make them better off.
One of the major advantages of a market-based
approach to global climate policy is its cost-effectiveness. Because the cost of GHG emissions abatement
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varies significantly from place to place, and because
the global environmental benefit of GHG reduction
is independent of where the emissions are reduced,
allowing any agreed level of total GHG abatement to
be undertaken where it is least costly will minimize
the overall cost of achieving the policy goal. Emissions trading allows that least-cost strategy to be
identified and pursued; fixed national caps (or
worse, technology standards) do not.
Numerous studies indicate that allowing global
flexibility in the location of GHG emissions abatement through emissions trading would cut the estimated total cost of emissions controls considerably.
For example, the models used in a recent study of
Kyoto Protocol compliance costs suggest that the
cost savings from emissions trading within the
Annex I countries (the industrialized countries that
agreed to cap their total emissions, including Russia
and Ukraine, with their likely surplus of emission allowances) are on the order of 30–50%, compared
with a similar emissions reduction treaty with efficient domestic policies but without international
trading (see Weyant and Hill in Suggested Reading).
Even greater cost savings could be reaped from
global trading—on the order of 65–85%. The cost
savings also would be higher when compared with
technology standards, because both tradable and
nontradable national quotas allow important flexibility in the choice of abatement method. And these
figures may understate the cost savings, because
many of the models already assume some degree of
cost-minimizing coordination of abatement among
members of the European Union.
To put these figures in context, consider the Energy Modeling Forum results reported by Weyant
and Hill on the costs of meeting the Kyoto Protocol
targets (measured in lost gross domestic product
[GDP]) without flexible international policy design.
Figures are reported for the United States, Japan, the
European Union, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand. The annual costs summed over all these
countries in 2010 range from just under $100 billion to almost $500 billion. The cost of maintaining
or further reducing emissions beyond the initial
commitment period would be larger still. Thus, the
50% cost savings offered by a flexible market-based
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policy would mean considerable savings in absolute
terms.
Of course, real-world cost savings may be different from these model estimates. The degree of cost
savings associated with flexibility will depend on the
stringency of the emissions target, the cost of meeting that target without flexibility, the specific countries that participate in the treaty, and other factors.
Real-world cost savings might be greater if emissions
trading induces innovation that further lowers abatement costs, if trading is allowed over time as well as
across countries, or if controlling GHG emissions in
industrialized countries turns out to be even more
expensive (relative to developing countries) than
predicted. But real-world cost savings from flexibility
might be lower if arranging allowance transactions
proves costly, or if it turns out that industrialized
countries can control GHG emissions at home at
costs much lower (relative to developing countries)
than predicted.
Allowance trading markets have demonstrated
substantial cost savings in practice when applied to
several national pollution problems. The United
States has used market-based approaches to phase
out lead in gasoline, to cut SO2 emissions as a
means to reduce acid rain, and to control urban air
pollutants in Los Angeles. The cost savings in the
lead and SO2 cases were substantial—50% or more
compared with a control policy in which no trades
were allowed. (GHGs seem to be an even better
prospect for trading than lead and SO2, because the
variation in global abatement costs is even wider and
because there are no local “hot spot” problems for
most major GHGs.) The SO2 trading policy also
stimulated energy efficiency investments and the use
of new abatement technologies. The SO2 experience
suggests that the more cost-effective market-based
policy enabled the U.S. Congress to “buy” more pollution control than it would have if control were
more expensive. Similarly, reducing the cost of GHG
abatement could well lead countries to undertake
more abatement than they otherwise would.
GHG allowance trading could also mobilize substantial resource flows to developing countries, assuming that abatement costs are lower in developing
countries and that the treaty allocates GHG emis-
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sions control obligations to constrain industrialized
countries while giving developing countries some
headroom to grow. These resource flows would help
poorer countries shift to a development path that is
more prosperous but with lower emissions, invest in
local health and environmental needs, and pursue
other social priorities. Resource flows to poorer
countries under a climate treaty employing emissions trading could grow to exceed all official international development assistance. Some studies suggest that, compared with no treaty at all, developing
countries would be net losers under a no-trading
policy in which industrialized countries cut their
own emissions (and, in the process, cut their product imports from developing countries) and net winners under a global allowance trading system in
which the cost of abatement is reduced and the developing countries can profit from allowance sales.
The prospect of such gains from allowance sales
could, in turn, attract developing countries to participate in the GHG abatement regime. (One caveat to
these conclusions is that large resource inflows to
developing countries could create adverse terms of
trade that would crimp the growth of the developing
countries’ regular exports, as distinct from their exports of allowances.)
Participation is a fundamental issue in an international climate agreement. Under international law,
no country is bound by a treaty unless it consents to
participate. (This is quite different from national law,
under which majority rule or perhaps fiat [a government decree] can impose constraints on emitters
without the emitters’ consent.) Thus, under international law, countries must find treaty participation to
be in their interest. Without the participation of developing countries in particular, industrialized countries’ GHG emission controls could be futile; the
emissions of developing economies are increasing
rapidly and soon will account for more than half of
global emissions. Controls on emissions imposed
only in industrialized countries could wind up missing the larger share of global emissions and, worse,
could induce emissions-related activities to shift to
unconstrained developing countries (as world fuel
prices fall and emitting industries relocate), thereby
exacerbating the growth in developing country emis-

sions. Such leakage of emissions from constrained to
unconstrained countries could offset much of the
climate protection sought by a treaty. Moreover, legislators in industrialized countries will be loath to
vote to ratify less-than-global emissions constraints
that drive emissions-related jobs out of their electoral districts; this situation appeared to be part of
the predicament with ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in the United States after it was negotiated. Thus,
some way of getting developing countries to participate in the global GHG treaty on terms they find attractive seems crucial to ensure environmental effectiveness, reduce global abatement costs, direct
needed resource flows to poorer countries, and encourage industrialized countries to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol. Major developing countries such as China
may see global climate change as a low priority (or
even a benefit to their farmers) and hence may resist
joining an emissions abatement treaty. Emissions
trading offers a built-in feature—the resource flows
to developing countries in return for their abatement
efforts and associated allowance sales—that could
accomplish broad participation. It also implies that
assignments of “headroom” allowances (such as
those to Russia in the Kyoto Protocol) are not a mistake but rather constitute an essential mechanism
for securing participation by otherwise reluctant
countries.
GHG taxes could, in principle, generate gains in
cost-effectiveness equal to those of an allowance
trading market. Theoretically, a tax imposed to
achieve a given level of emissions would exactly
equal the market price for the allowances issued to
achieve that same quantity of emissions. A tax
would offer more certainty about overall costs, because the tax would be fixed in advance, whereas the
price of emissions allowances could vary. But a tax
would offer less certainty about environmental results, because the tax by its nature does not constrain the quantity of emissions (and tradable allowances do). Depending on the relative importance
of cost escalations versus emissions escalations, this
factor could be important. Moreover, a tax would
raise revenue that could be used to offset other distortionary taxes; tradable allowances could raise revenue only if they were initially sold or auctioned, not
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if they were issued free of charge. Meanwhile, a tax
would not involve the transaction costs of structuring and operating allowance trading but would involve the administrative costs of tax collection.
More problematic is that an internationally
agreed emissions tax (whether administered globally
or nationally) could be circumvented by national
subsidies and other tax code changes targeted to
buffer high-emitting industries. This problem of “fiscal cushioning” is very difficult to monitor from outside, is worsened by national tax administration, and
undermines the ability of the tax to constrain actual
emissions.
Furthermore, a GHG tax would not create an automatic mechanism for resource transfers to developing countries, which are crucial to getting developing countries engaged. Politically difficult side
payments to developing countries would have to accompany the tax to secure these countries’ participation in the tax regime. Such payments could claim
much of the tax revenue that might have been put to
offsetting other distortionary taxes. Moreover, if
poorly designed, these side payments could undermine the incentive effect of the tax by reducing the
net price paid for emitting. Such will be the case if
the revenue redistributions are in proportion to economic activity or emissions abatement, rather than
being decoupled from emissions. And to attract
countries’ participation, the side payments would
have to be in proportion to the actual economic burden imposed by the emissions tax (net of environmental benefits to that country), or countries will
not agree to the tax. Thus it seems hard to escape
the prospect that participation-attracting side payments would undermine the incentive effect of an
emissions tax. Side payments delivered through developing countries’ sales of tradable allowances, in
contrast, would not undermine the incentive effect
of the emissions trading system, because the quantity constraint on aggregate emissions would still be
binding.
In developing countries, subsidies for abatement
are often proposed in domestic programs or in the
guise of official development assistance targeted at
emissions-abating activities. Developing countries
tend to resist such conditionality, unless it is truly
210 CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS AND POLICY

additional aid money. Industrialized countries sometimes resist making larger taxpayer-financed budget
outlays for foreign aid. From an environmental point
of view, a serious concern with subsidies for abatement is their potential to yield perverse consequences. Although the subsidy for abatement (such
as a tax on emissions, or tradable allowances) can reduce emissions at the margin by each subsidy-earning firm, the subsidy also could reduce the cost of
doing business in the emitting industry if it is poorly
designed—particularly if it is a subsidy per unit of
output or emissions versus a lump-sum transfer. A
subsidy for abatement can attract entry or investment into the emitting industry and perversely increase net emissions. Side payments delivered
through developing countries’ sales of tradable allowances, by contrast, would not yield perverse impacts on emissions, because the quantity constraint
on aggregate emissions would still be binding.

Generic Concerns about
Emissions Policy
Emissions trading therefore has several salient advantages over the other options for international
GHG policy, such as technology standards, taxes,
subsidies, and fixed national caps. But despite the
apparent advantages of an emissions trading system,
many countries and commentators continue to express concerns about using this approach to control
GHG emissions—concerns about negotiating allowance allocations, ensuring participation, deterring free riding, enforcing compliance, reducing
cross-national leakage, and measuring emissions.
These concerns, however, apply generically to any
emissions control regime, and allowing trading
could actually ease these concerns.
Critics worry that it will be difficult to negotiate
initial allowance allocations among countries. But
the problem of allocating control and cost responsibilities is unavoidable in any climate agreement, with
or without trading, and trading could ease this problem in two ways. First, trading makes the cost allocation transparent. Technology standards and national
caps implicitly impose cost burdens that vary across
countries. The use of formal emissions trading
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makes this allocation explicit rather than disguised,
and this transparency can facilitate a bargain. Second, allowance trading enables flexibility after the
initial allocation. Countries facing potentially high
cost burdens will know that they can purchase
abatement from countries with lower costs, and
countries with low-cost abatement opportunities will
know that they can earn substantial resource flows
by selling allowances to those with higher costs. This
flexibility would significantly relax the pressure on
negotiators to devise ideal, once-and-for all allocations in the treaty itself. As Nobel Prize–winning
economist Ronald Coase pointed out, the lower the
obstacles to reallocation of entitlements, the less the
initial assignment matters. Thus, without the opportunity for trading, initial GHG policy targets would
be more difficult to negotiate.
Some argue that a cap-and-trade system is “a political nonstarter” because developing countries will
refuse to accept caps and industrialized countries
will refuse to make large resource transfers. But any
control regime with binding targets will have to face
this problem because under international law, countries must be attracted to participate. A cap-andtrade system has important advantages. The opportunity to earn significant resource transfers via
allowance sales can make accepting phased-in caps
(with headroom for future growth) more attractive to
developing countries. And wealthy countries would
undertake these transfers because they yield significant cost savings compared with a treaty without
such trading. Moreover, the myriad private transactions involved in formal emissions trading would not
raise the political specter of increasing official foreign
aid financed by taxpayers. The other possibility, a set
of domestic GHG taxes imposed separately by individual countries, probably would founder on the
lack of transparency of fiscal systems and the apparent unwillingness of developing countries to substantially increase their own energy tax burdens.
Fundamental problems for any international
treaty are engaging participation and deterring free
riding (that is, benefiting from the group’s efforts
without participating). Treaty restrictions can be imposed only on consenting countries, making any
kind of international collective action difficult. How-

ever, formal emissions trading has signal advantages
over other policy options in securing participation
while limiting the perverse consequences of side
payments. Reluctant countries can be assigned headroom allowances (an in-kind side payment) that they
can then sell, and the aggregate cap maintains the
environmental effectiveness of the regime. If free riding is not deterred, the entire collective regime may
unravel. Using allowance trading in a GHG treaty
can reduce free riding: It dramatically lowers the cost
of participation to industrialized countries and raises
the profits from participation for developing countries. Because noncompliance is just a form of free
riding, these incentives for participation in an emissions trading regime can also enhance compliance.
Emissions leakage—that is, emissions abatement
achieved in one location being offset by increased
emissions in unregulated locations—will afflict any
subglobal treaty, whether it uses trading or not.
Leakage can arise in the short term as emissions
abaters reduce energy demand or timber supply, influencing world prices for these commodities and increasing the quantity emitted elsewhere. It also can
arise in the long term as industries relocate to avoid
controls. Both informal and formal allowance trading
would reduce such leakage by reducing the abatement cost (thereby reducing the incentive for industry to relocate) and by expanding participation and
inhibiting free riding (thereby enlarging the group of
countries agreeing to constrain emissions).
An informal market in joint implementation or
CDM credits from abatement projects in uncapped
host countries may raise a special concern about
local (within-country) leakage from these projects
to other emissions sources in the same host country. However, the question is whether such local
leakage within the project host country would be
greater than the leakage from capped to uncapped
countries that would have occurred if the same
amount of abatement had been undertaken only
within the project investor country. Meanwhile,
local leakage would not be a problem in a formal allowance trading market with national caps, because
all emissions of all participating countries would be
counted in the national inventories used to assess
compliance.
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Another generic concern regards the ability to
measure the magnitude of abatement efforts. Any
treaty, with or without trading, requires forecasts of
baseline emissions and subsequent monitoring to
evaluate the likely cost of limitation options, the effectiveness of abatement efforts, and the extent of emissions leakage. A formal cap-and-trade system would
not complicate these tasks; it would measure results
using the same national inventories as under an
agreement without trading. The CDM may add some
uncertainty about what the emissions would otherwise have been in the uncapped project host country.
But prohibiting CDM credits because of such uncertainty would forfeit both the opportunity to engage
countries without national emissions caps in early
GHG control efforts, and the opportunity to obtain
low-cost abatement services in those countries. A better approach might be to allow both the cap-andtrade system and the CDM but to exercise caution by
adjusting the credit for all abatement efforts (not only
the CDM) in proportion to the projects’ measurement credibility, and to invite investors to augment
the credit calculation by showing more reliable emissions accounting—thus providing incentives for investors to improve measurement capabilities.

Specific Concerns about
Emissions Trading
Other concerns apply with special force to international market-based emissions trading regimes. Yet
these specific concerns often have tended to receive
less attention in the debate over different international GHG control strategies.
Transaction costs include the costs of searching
for trading partners, negotiating deals, securing regulatory approval, monitoring and enforcing deals, and
insuring against the risk of failure. High transaction
costs in the emissions abatement market would impede trades and raise total costs. Evidence from previous U.S. environmental markets such as the lead
phasedown, the Los Angeles smog control program,
and an experiment with water pollution trading on
the Fox River in Wisconsin suggests that transaction
costs can determine the success or failure of the
trading system.
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The transaction costs of joint implementation and
the CDM, as currently structured, appear to be very
high. Partners are hard to identify, each negotiation is
novel, each project must be approved by the host
and investor governments (and potentially by the
CDM governance system), and each investor must
monitor its own projects. Moreover, if joint implementation and the CDM require investors to support
entire projects, each investor bears a large risk of
project failure. The transaction costs of joint implementation and the CDM could be reduced through
brokers (many of which are emerging), information
exchanges, streamlined approval processes, accredited monitoring agents (including environmental
nongovernmental organizations), mutual funds and
other means of risk diversification, and official credit.
The transaction costs of a formal market for allowance trading would be much lower, especially if
fungible allowances are traded on organized exchanges. Indeed, reducing transaction costs would
be a central goal of such a formal system. Lower
transaction costs would improve cost-effectiveness
and also would promise easier opportunities to reallocate control burdens, thereby helping to facilitate
the initial allocation negotiations. (A GHG tax would
avoid interfirm transaction costs but would entail
significant administrative costs in collecting the tax.)
A second concern is the role of national governments in the market. National governments might
try to influence the market to their advantage, obstruct allowance trades, or otherwise depart from the
conditions of well-functioning abatement markets
assumed in the estimates of cost savings. Governments might pursue such strategies to favor domestic interests against foreign rivals, to redistribute
wealth within a country, or for other purposes that
in practice conflict with the operation of the international climate treaty regime. In the U.S. SO2 trading
system, for example, several states have attempted to
intervene in the national market (for example, by
trying to prevent electric power companies from
switching to lower-sulfur out-of-state fuels, and by
trying to prevent sales of allowances to upwind
sources), but these efforts have so far been blunted
by the limits on states’ power to restrict interstate
trade under the U.S. Constitution. National interpo-
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sitions in a global GHG market could be limited by
international trade law, but this depends on
untested legal questions about whether and how
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
World Trade Organization (WTO) law applies to
trade in GHG allowances.
Moreover, for trading to be fully cost-effective, national governments must let the trading be conducted by the entities actually responsible for GHG
abatement and sequestration. Assigning allowances
and credits to these entities will mobilize decentralized competition, creativity, and flexibility. It seems
likely in the United States but might not occur so
well (or at all) in countries where the state is a more
active supervisor or owner of industry. (A GHG tax
would also be vulnerable to national government
manipulation, chiefly via subsidies and changes in
the domestic tax code to buffer the impact of the
GHG tax on domestic industries. Such fiscal cushioning would be exceedingly difficult for outsiders to
monitor and penalize.)
A third specific concern is international market
power. Concentrated power over allowance or credit
prices could arise on the sellers’ side (for example, a
GHG “OPEC”) or on the buyers’ side (for example,
a central sole purchasing agent for industrialized
countries). Although there should be a plethora of
competitors in an international GHG allowance market, market power could be enhanced by large staterun energy or forestry companies and by countries’
efforts to prevent additional countries from entering
the market. Many trading models show Russia as the
main seller of allowances in an Annex I (industrialized country) trading system, and China as another
main seller in a global system. And unlike domestic
antitrust (competition) law, international law has no
basic framework to combat market power; even if it
did, enforcing such rules against nations (or cartels
of nations) could be quite difficult. A successful international emissions trading system could require
the evolution of new international antitrust remedies, either in general or specific to the climate
treaty. “Thickening” the market is probably the best
tonic for fears of market power, again underscoring
the importance of broadening participation in the
treaty noted above.

Furthermore, centralized purchasing or sales
agents advocated to reduce search and approval
costs (for example, the CDM governing board, or
proposals to route project investments through a few
multilateral institutions such as the World Bank)
could also invite market power. A better way to reduce transaction costs is through organized exchanges and fungible allowances.

The International Political Economy
of Policy Design
Given the advantages of international emissions
trading—lower cost, valuable resource flows, greater
participation—what is one to make of its opposition? Several speculative hypotheses are worth
exploring.
Opponents may misunderstand or genuinely
doubt the advantages of international emissions
trading. For example, developing countries’ fears of
“carbon colonialism” may reflect a view that the
market power and trading savvy of wealthy investors
would depress allowance and credit prices, leading
poorer countries to sell out their future at a loss.
This concern may be legitimate, and it warrants
efforts to combat market power and build the capacity of developing countries to bargain effectively in
an allowance trading market.
Opponents may also have nonclimate agendas.
Some may favor a high-cost regime because their objective is moral condemnation or broader social
change in industrialized countries, not cost-effective
climate protection. Some may worry that fairness requires industrialized countries to take the lead—but
allowance trading does require wealthy countries to
foot the bill for global abatement efforts; and as
noted above, global allowance trading makes developing countries net winners instead of net losers,
which seems far more fair.
Strategic behavior may also be at work. First,
some government decisionmakers, in both developing and industrialized countries, may prefer official
government aid to private market transactions because they believe they can control the former more
effectively. Indeed some developing country government officials may oppose trading because they see
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the market sector, which would gain from allowance
trading, as a domestic political rival—a replay of
similar struggles in the transition from feudal and
state-run societies to market capitalism. Second,
some industrialized countries may prefer a less flexible control regime because it limits access by their
trade rivals to lower-cost abatement opportunities.
This may explain the European Union’s preference
for an E.U. “bubble” (trading region) under the climate treaty, but its opposition to unrestricted global
allowance trading and its embrace of cumbersome
“supplementarity” restrictions on trading volumes.
Opposition might also be a move to gain leverage
over the goal (target or cap). Advocates of aggressive
climate protection may withhold support for trading
until it is paired with a more stringent cap—risking a
costly treaty, or no agreement at all. Meanwhile,
skeptics of aggressive climate policy may fear that
cost-effective policy tools are an all-too-enticing “fast
train to the wrong station,” inducing premature
adoption of an overly stringent cap. Of course, the
goal of climate policy should be chosen with great
care. Yet the skeptics’ gambit of urging a higher-cost
“slow train” (in the hopes that it will derail any GHG
limitations agreement) may only invite “Murder on
the Orient Express”—an unholy alliance behind a
treaty that both costs more and is less environmentally effective—a “lose-lose” luxury train to the
wrong station.

text. The U.S. acid rain trading system cannot just
be transplanted to global climate policy. The legal
and institutional terrain is different at the international level, and international environmental markets
need to be designed with that terrain in mind. In
particular, the requirement of consent to international treaty law puts extra emphasis on securing
participation, which in turn makes emissions trading
even more attractive at the international level than it
is at the national level, but also requires the use of
headroom allowance allocations to engage otherwise
reluctant emitting countries. To be environmentally
effective and economically efficient, the Kyoto Protocol needs to be expanded to engage developing
countries in a global emissions trading regime.
Another challenge is bridging from normatively
desirable policy design to actually adopted policy design. The economics of climate policy may not match
the politics of climate policy. Even if smart policy designers address the generic and specific concerns surrounding international emissions trading and thereby
deliver an efficient policy design to global climate negotiators, such a policy design will still confront the
political marketplace in which efficiency may be
viewed with indifference or even antipathy. Empirical
research is warranted to explore and reveal the positive politics of international climate policy design.
Without such inquiry, designing the most efficient
global climate policy may be for naught.

Toward Successful International
Emissions Trading
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